Static Analysis of Implicit Control Flow: Resolving Java Reflection and Android Intents

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Abstract—Implicit or indirect control flow is a transfer of control between procedures using some mechanism other than an explicit procedure call. Implicit control flow is a staple design pattern that adds flexibility to system design. However, it is challenging for a static analysis to compute or verify properties about a system that uses implicit control flow.

This paper presents static analyses for two types of implicit control flow that frequently appear in Android apps: Java reflection and Android intents. Our analyses help to resolve where control flows and what data is passed. This information improves the precision of downstream analyses, which no longer need to make conservative assumptions about implicit control flow.

We have implemented our techniques for Java. We enhanced an existing security analysis with a more precise treatment of reflection and intents. In a case study involving ten real-world Android apps that use both intents and reflection, precision of the security analysis was increased on average by two orders of magnitude.

I. INTRODUCTION

Programs are easier to understand and analyze when they use explicit control flow: that is, each procedure call invokes just one target procedure. However, explicit control flow is insufficiently flexible for many important domains, so implicit control flow is a common programming paradigm. For example, in object-oriented dispatch a method call invokes one of multiple implementations at run time. Another common use of implicit control flow is in design patterns, many of which add a level of indirection in order to increase expressiveness. This indirection often makes the target of a procedure call more difficult to determine statically.

Implicit control flow is a challenge for program analysis. When a static analysis encounters a procedure call, the analysis usually approximates the call's behavior by a summary, which conservatively generalizes the effects of any target of the call. If there is only one possible target (as with a normal procedure call) or a small number that share a common specification (as with object-oriented dispatch), the summary can be relatively precise. But if the set of possible targets is large, then the static analysis must use a very weak specification, causing it to yield an imprecise result.

The imprecision is caused by a lack of information about possible call targets and about the types of data passed as arguments at each call. The goal of this paper is to provide a sound and sufficiently precise estimate of potential call targets and of the encapsulated data communicated in implicit invocations, in order to improve the precision of downstream program analyses. Our evaluation focuses on a particular domain — Android mobile apps — in which implicit invocation significantly degrades static analysis. In our experience [1], the largest challenge to analyzing Android apps is their use of reflection and intents, and this led us to our research on resolving implicit invocation. We are not aware of a previous solution that handles reflection and intents soundly and with high precision.

Reflection permits a program to examine and modify its own data or behavior [2]. Our interest is in use of reflection to invoke procedures. For example, in Java an object m of type Method represents a method in the running program; mcan be constructed in a variety of ways, including by name lookup from arbitrary strings. Then, the Java program can call m.invoke(...) to invoke the method that m represents. Other programming languages provide similar functionality, including C#, Go, Haskell, JavaScript, ML, Objective-C, PHP, Perl, Python, R, Ruby, Scala, and more.

Android intents are the standard inter-component communication mechanism in Android. They are used for communication within an app (an app may be made up of dozens of components), between apps, and with the Android system. An Android component can send or broadcast intents and can register interest in receiving intents. The Android architecture shares similarities with blackboard systems and other messagepassing and distributed systems.

By default, a sound program analysis must treat reflection and intents conservatively — the analysis must assume that anything could happen at uses of reflection and intents, making its results imprecise. We have built a simple, conservative, and quite precise static analysis that models the effects of reflection and intents on program behavior. The key idea is to resolve implicit control and data flow first to improve the estimates of what procedures are being called and what data is being passed; as a result, those constructs introduce no more imprecision into a downstream analysis than a regular procedure call does.¹

Both control flow and data flow are important. For reflection, our approach handles control flow by analyzing reflective calls to methods and constructors to estimate which classes and methods may be manipulated, and it handles data flow via an enhanced constant propagation. For intents, our approach handles control flow by using previous work [3] to obtain component communication patterns, and it handles data flow by analyzing the payloads that are carried by intents.

We have implemented our approach for Java. We evaluated our implementation on open-source apps, in the context of an

¹Our approach does not change the representation of the program, either on disk or in memory in the compiler; see Section III-B.

existing information flow type system for Android security [1]. Most apps use reflection and/or intents, so accurately handling reflection and intents is critical in this domain. Unsoundness is unacceptable because it would lead to security holes, and poor precision would make the technique unusable due to excessive false-positive alarms. The reflection and intent analyses increased the precision of the information flow type system by two orders of magnitude. Our implementation is freely available in the SPARTA toolset (http://types.cs.washington.edu/sparta/), including source code and user manual, and the reflection analysis is also integrated into the Checker Framework (http://checker-framework.org/).

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents two motivating examples. Sections III and IV present our analyses that resolve reflection and intents. Section V formally analyzes the typing rules. Section VI evaluates the type inference rules, and Section VII shows how the reflection and intent analyses improve the precision of a downstream analysis. Section VIII discusses related work, and Section IX concludes.

II. MOTIVATION

Imprecision due to implicit control flow affects every static analysis. For concreteness, consider a noninterference type system [4], which guarantees that the program does not leak sensitive data. When run on the Android app Aard Dictionary (http://aarddict.org/), the type system issues false positive warnings due to its conservative handling of implicit control flows. When our reflection and intent analyses are integrated into it, the type system remains sound but no longer issues the false positive warnings.

Our work improves precision by extending existing type systems in order to eliminate false positive warnings in cases of implicit control flows.

Noninterference type system The noninterference type system distinguishes high-security-level values from low-security-level values; for brevity, High and Low values. The static property checked is that values in High variables are not leaked to Low variables. Variables and expressions marked High may hold a Low value at run time; this is also expressed as Low <: High, where the symbol "<:" denotes subtyping.

To use this type system, a user annotates each type with High or Low, the default being Low. The type system is conservative: if it issues no warnings, then the program has no interference and running it does not leak any High data to Low contexts.

A. Reflection

Some calls to Method.invoke return a High value at run time. Thus, the signature of Method.invoke (line 15 of Figure 1) must have a High return type; any other return type in the summary would be unsound. Some calls to Method.invoke always return a Low value. The conservative signature of Method.invoke causes false positive warnings in such cases.

Figure 1 illustrates the problem in Aard Dictionary. The component ArticleViewActivity uses an ActionBar, which is a feature that was introduced in version 11 of the Android API. In order to prevent run-time errors for a user who has an older version of Android (and also to enable the app to compile when a developer is using an older version of the Android API), this app uses reflection to call methods related to the ActionBar. The

```
1
    class ArticleViewActivity extends Activity
2
3
      void onCreate (Bundle savedInstanceState)
        if (android.os.Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 11) {
4
          // Android version 11 and later has Action Bar
5
          Method getActionBar =
            getClass().getMethod("getActionBar");
6
7
8
          @Low Object actionBar = getActionBar.invoke(this);
           . . .
9
10
      }
11
    }
12
13
    // Library annotations:
14
    class Method {
15
      @High Object invoke(Object obj, Object... args) {...}
16
    class Activity {
17
18
      // Only exists in Android SDK 11 and above.
19
      @Low ActionBar getActionBar() {...}
20
    }
```

Fig. 1. A noninterference type-checker produces a false positive warning on line 7, where the return type of Method.invoke, of type High, is assigned to variable actionBar which has declared type Low. The call on line 7 always returns a Low value at run time (even though other calls to invoke may in general return a High value), so the assignment is safe. When the noninterference type system is augmented by our reflection analysis, it no longer issues the false positive warning.

noninterference type-checker issues a false positive due to the use of reflection; our reflection analysis (Section III) eliminates the false positive warning.

Our example uses a noninterference type system, but other type systems suffer similar false positives. Consider a nullness analysis [5]. The library annotations must mark the return type of Method.invoke as @Nullable. The reflection analysis can determine that some calls to invoke return a non-null value, and thus it eliminates false positives in the nullness analysis.

B. Android Intents

An Android component might send a High value via an intent message to another component; therefore, the summary for methods that retrieve data from an intent (lines 26–27 of Figure 2) must conservatively assume that the data is a High value. This conservative summary may cause false positive warnings when the data is of type Low at run time.

Figure 2 shows another example from Aard Dictionary. The components DictionaryMain and WordTranslator use Android intents to communicate. Android intents are messages sent between Android components, and those messages contain "extras", which is a mapping of keys to objects. Component DictionaryMain creates an intent object i, adds Low-security extra data to i's extras mapping, and on line 7 calls the Android library method startActivity to send the intent. The Android system then calls WordTranslator.onCreate, which is declared on line 12. The noninterference type-checker issues a false positive due to the use of intents; our intent analysis (Section IV) eliminates the false positive warning.

III. REFLECTION RESOLUTION

Reflection is a metaprogramming mechanism that enhances the flexibility and expressiveness of a programming language. Its primary purpose is to enable a program to dynamically exhibit behavior that is not expressed by static dependencies in the source code.

```
class DictionaryMain extends Activity {
 1
2
     void translateWord(int source, int target, String word){
3
         Intent i = new Intent(this, WordTranslator.class);
4
         i.putExtra("source", source);
5
         i.putExtra("target", target);
6
         i.putExtra("word", word);
7
         startActivity(i);
8
      }
9
    }
10
11
    class WordTranslator extends Activity {
12
      void onCreate (Bundle savedInstanceState)
13
         Intent i = getIntent();
14
         int source = i.getIntegerExtra("source");
15
         int target = i.getIntegerExtra("target");
16
         String word = i.getStringExtra("word");
17
         showResult(translate(source, target, word));
18
19
      String translate (int source, int target, String word)
           {...}
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
      Intent getIntent() {...}
      void showResult(String result) {...}
    // Library annotations:
    class Intent {
      @High Integer getIntegerExtra(String key) {...}
      @High String getStringExtra(String key) {...}
```

Fig. 2. A noninterference type-checker produces false positive warnings on lines 14–16, where the return type of get*Extra, of type High, is assigned to variables with declared type Low (the default type). The calls on lines 14–16 always return a Low value at run time (even though other calls to get*Extra may in general return a High value), so the assignments are safe. When the noninterference type system is augmented by our intent analysis, it no longer issues the false positive warnings.

Reflection is commonly used for the following four use cases, among others. (1) Provide backward compatibility by accessing an API method that may or may not exist at run time. The code implements a fallback solution so the app can run even if a certain API method does not exist, e.g., on older devices. (2) Access private API methods and fields, which offer functionality beyond what is provided by the public API. (3) Implement design pattern such as duck typing. (4) Code obfuscation to make it harder to reverse-engineer the program, e.g., code that accesses premium features that require a separate purchase. The Android developer documentation encourages the use of reflection to provide backward compatibility and for code obfuscation.

Not all uses of reflection can be statically resolved, but our experiments show that many of them can. Whenever the developer runs a code analysis, it is beneficial to the analysis if as much reflection as possible is resolved, in order to reduce false positive warnings. Analysis results, annotations, and any other information that is used in-house by the developer need not be provided to users of the software, so any obfuscation is not compromised.

Approach for reflection resolution: Without further information about what method is reflectively called, a static analysis must assume that a reflective call could invoke any arbitrary method. Such a conservative assumption increases the likelihood of false positive warnings.

At each call to Method.invoke, our analysis soundly estimates which methods might be invoked at runtime. Based on this estimate, our analysis statically resolves the Method.invoke call that is, it provides type information about arguments and return types for a downstream analysis. The results are soundly determined solely based on information available at compile time.

The reflection resolution consists of the following parts:

- 1) *Reflection type system*: Tracks and infers the possible names of classes, methods, and constructors used by reflective calls. (Section III-A)
- 2) *Reflection resolver*: Uses the reflection type system to estimate the signatures of methods or constructors that can be invoked by a reflective call. (Section III-B)

A. Reflection type system

Our reflection type system refines the Java type system to provide more information about array, Class, Method, and Constructor values. In particular, it provides an estimate, for each expression of those types, of the values they might evaluate to at run time.

For expressions of type class, there are two possible annotations, @classVal and @classBound, representing either an exact class value or an upper bound of the class value. For example, @classVal("java.util.HashMap") indicates that the class object represents the java.util.HashMap class. Alternatively, @classBound("java.util.HashMap") indicates that the class object represents java.util.HashMap or a subclass of it.

For expressions of type Method and Constructor, the type annotation indicates estimates for the class, method name, and number of parameters. For example,

indicates that the method represents either HashMap.containsKey or HashMap.containsValue, with exactly 1 parameter. Likewise, the MethodVal type may have more than one value for the class name or number of parameters. The represented methods are the Cartesian product of all possible class names, method names, and numbers of parameters. For a constructor, the method name is "<init>", so no separate @ConstructorVal annotation is necessary.

The MethodVal type is imprecise in that it indicates the number of parameters that the method takes, but not their type. This means that the type system cannot distinguish methods in the uncommon and discouraged [6] case of method overloading. This was a conscious design decision that reduces the verbosity and complexity of the annotations, without any practical negative consequences. In our experiments with more than 300,000 lines of Java code, this imprecision in the type system never prevented a reflective call from being resolved.

For all types in our type system, the size of the set of values is capped at 10. This never happened in our case studies. If a programmer writes, or the type system infers, a set of values of size larger than 10, then the type is widened to its respective top type. A top type indicates that the type system has no estimate for the expression: the type system's estimate is that the run-time value could be any value that conforms to the Java type. The top type is the default, and it is represented in source code as the absence of any annotation.

1) Type checking: The reflection type system enforces standard type system guarantees, e.g. that the right-hand side of an assignment is a subtype of the left-hand side. These typing rules follow those of Java, they are standard for an object-oriented programming language, and they are familiar to programmers. e: int val is the statically computable value of e

e:@IntVal(val)

$\frac{e: \texttt{QIntVal}(\pi)}{\texttt{new C}[e]: \texttt{QArrayLen}(\pi)}$

new C[] $\{e_1, ..., e_n\}$: **(ArrayLen** (*n*)

Fig. 3. Inference rules for @StringVal, @IntVal, and @ArrayLen.

$\frac{fqn \text{ is the fully qualified class name of } c}{c.class: @ClassVal(fqn)}$

s: @StringVal(${f V}$)

Class.forName(S): @ClassVal(V)

$e: \tau$ fqn is the fully qualified class name of τ

e.getClass(): @ClassBound(<math>fqn)

 $\frac{\left(e: @ClassBound (V) \lor e: @ClassVal (V)\right)}{s: @StringVal (\mu) \quad p: @ArrayLen (\pi)}$ $e.getMethod (s, p): @MethodVal (cn=V, mn=\mu, np=\pi)$

 $\frac{e: @ClassVal(V) \quad p: @ArrayLen(\pi)}{e.getConstructor(p): @MethodVal(cn=V,mn="<init>",np=\pi)}$

Fig. 4. Selected inference rules for the @ClassVal, @ClassBound, and @MethodVal annotations. Additional rules exist for expressions with similar semantics but that call methods with different names or signatures.

Therefore, we do not detail them in this paper. The reflection type system and our implementation are compatible with all Java features, including generics (type polymorphism).

2) *Type inference:* Programmers do not need to write type annotations within method bodies, because our system performs local type inference. More specifically, for local variables, casts, and instanceof expressions, the absence of any annotation indicates that the type system should infer the most precise possible type from the context. For all other locations — notably fields, method signatures, and generic type arguments — a missing annotation is interpreted as the top type.

The local type inference is flow-sensitive. It takes advantage of expression typing rules that yield more precise types than standard Java type-checking would.

a) Inference of @stringVal, @IntVal, and @ArrayLen: We have designed and implemented a dataflow analysis that infers and tracks types providing an estimate for the possible values of each expression. Our implementation goes beyond constant folding and propagation: it evaluates side-effect-free methods, it infers and tracks the length of each array, and it computes a set of values rather than just one. For example, @ArrayLen({3,4}) indicates that at run time the array has length 3 or 4. The reflection type system builds on top of this dataflow analysis.

b) Inference of @ClassVal and @ClassBound: The reflection type system infers the exact class name (@ClassVal) for a Class literal (C.class), and for a static method call (e.g., Class .forName(arg), ClassLoader.loadClass(arg), ...) if the argument has a sufficiently precise @StringVal estimate. In contrast, it infers an upper bound (@ClassBound) for instance method calls (e.g., obj.getClass()).

An exact class name is necessary to precisely resolve reflectively-invoked constructors since a constructor in a subclass does not override a constructor in its superclass. Either an exact class name or a bound is adequate to resolve reflectively-invoked methods because of the subtyping rules for overridden methods.

c) Inference of @MethodVal: The reflection type system infers MethodVal types for methods and constructors that have been created via Java's Reflection API. A nonexhaustive list of examples includes calls to Class.getMethod(String name, Class<?>... paramTypes) and Class.getConstructor(Class<?>... paramTypes). For example, the type inferred for variable getActionBar on line 5 of Figure 1 is

@MethodVal(cn="ArticleViewActivity", mn="getActionBar", np=0). Although Figure 1 uses raw types, our inferred annotations supply the missing type argument information as well.

Figure 4 shows selected inference rules for the reflection type system.

B. Reflection resolver

Prior work (see Section VIII) commonly re-writes the source code or changes the AST within the program analysis tool, changing a call to Method.invoke into a call to the method that is reflectively invoked before analyzing the program. This approach interferes with the toolchain, preventing the code from being compiled or run in certain environments. This approach is also at odds with the very purpose of reflection: the program no longer adapts to its run-time environment and loses properties of obfuscation. A final problem is that not all discovered facts may be able to be expressed in source code form.

Our reflection resolver operates differently: it leaves the program unmodified but narrows the procedure summary — the specification of parameter and return types used during modular analysis — for that particular call site only. When the downstream analysis requests the summary at a call to Method.invoke, it receives the more precise information rather than the conservative summary that is written in the library source code. This transparent integration means that the downstream analysis does not need to be changed at all to be integrated with the reflection analysis.

C. Example

Recall the example of Figure 1. When the noninterference type system analyzes getActionBar.invoke(this) on line 7, it uses a method summary (like a declaration) to indicate the requirements and effects of the call. Ordinarily, it would use the following conservative declaration for Method.invoke:

@High Object invoke (Object recv, Object ... args)

However, the reflection type system inferred that the type of variable getActionBar is @MethodVal(cn="ArticleViewActivity", mn="getActionBar", np=0). In other words, at run time, the invoked method will be the following one from class ArticleViewActivity:

@Low ActionBar getActionBar ()

Thus, the noninterference type system has a precise type, Low, for the result of the invoke call. the reflection resolver provides the following precise procedure summary to the downstream analysis, for this call site only:

@Low Object invoke(Object recv, Object ... args)

As a result, the type system does not issue a false positive warning about the assignment to variable actionBar on line 7.

In addition to refining procedure return types as shown above, parameter types are refined to detect incorrect arguments. It would be possible to refine the Java types as well as the noninterference types (for instance, to warn about possible run-time type cast errors or to optimize method dispatch), but our implementation does not do so.

If the reflectively called method or constructor cannot be resolved uniquely, the reflection resolver determines the least upper bound of all return values and the greatest lower bound of all parameter and receiver types.

IV. ANDROID INTENT ANALYSIS

An Android app is organized as a collection of components that roughly correspond to different screens of an application and to background services.² Some apps consist of dozens of components. Intents are used for component communication, both within an app and among different apps. Intents are similar to messages, communicated asynchronously across components. Sending an Android intent implicitly invokes a method on the receiving component, just as making a reflective procedure call implicitly invokes a method. The use of intents is prevalent in Android apps: nearly all apps use intents [7], programmers use intents in large numbers [3], and intents are a potential target for attackers to introduce malware [7].

Intents present two challenges to static analyses: (i) control flow analysis, or determining which components communicate with one another, and (ii) data flow analysis, or determining what data is communicated. Both parts are important. An existing analysis, Epicc [3], partially solves the control flow challenge. Section IV-A describes how our implementation uses Epicc to compute component communication. Our key research contribution is to address the data flow challenge, which has resisted previous researchers. Section IV-B presents a novel static analysis that estimates the data passed in an Android intent.

The structure of Android intents: In addition to attributes that specify which components may receive the intent, an intent contains a map from strings to arbitrary data, called "extras". The extras map is used to pass additional information that is needed to perform an action. For example, an intent used to play a song contains the song's title and artist as extras. An invocation of the putExtra method adds a key-value entry to the intent map, which can be looked up via the getExtra method call. Without loss of generality, we will consider that every intent attribute is an entry in the map of extras. The use of extras is prevalent in Android: of the 1,052 apps in the F-Droid repository [8], 69% use intents with extra data. Figure 2 shows the common use case of an Android app sending and receiving an intent containing extras.

A. Component Communication Patterns

To precisely analyze the types of data sent through intents, our analysis requires sendIntent calls to be matched to the declarations of onReceive methods they implicitly invoke. We express this matching as a component communication pattern (CCP): a set of pairs of the form $\langle \text{sendIntent}(a, i), \text{onReceive}(b, j) \rangle$. Each pair in the CCP indicates that components a and b, possibly from different apps, may communicate through intents i and j, which intuitively denote the actual arguments and formal parameters of the implicit invocation.

To precompute an approximated CCP, our current implementation uses APKParser [9], Dare [10], and Epicc [3]. Our implementation inherits Epicc's limitations. Note, however, that Epicc's limitations are not inherent to our intent analysis, and they would disappear if we used a better analysis to compute CCP. As better CCP techniques become available [11], they can be plugged into our implementation. We now discuss sources of imprecision and unsoundness due to Epicc.

Epicc's sources of imprecision. Epicc's lack of support for URIs leads to imprecision since intents with the same action and category but different URIs are conservatively considered equal. As expected of a static analysis, Epicc also cannot handle cases where dynamic inputs determine the identity of receiver components. Epicc also handles this conservatively; all components are considered possible receivers. Furthermore, the points-to and string analyses used by Epicc are also sources of imprecision. Even with these limitations, all mentioned in [3], Epicc reports 91% precision in a case study with 348 apps.

Epicc's sources of unsoundness. Epicc unsoundly assumes that Android apps use no reflection. We used the type system of Section III to circumvent this limitation; see Section VII.. Epicc also unsoundly assumes that Android apps use no native calls.

Recall that while finding CCP is necessary, it is not sufficient. Since acceptable solutions exist for finding CCP, the focus of our intent analysis is the unsolved problem of estimating the payloads of intents, which is discussed below.

B. Intent Type System

This section presents a type system for Android intents. The type system verifies that the type of data stored within an intent conforms to the declared type of the intent, even in the presence of implicit invocation via intents.

For simplicity, this paper abstracts all methods that send intents as the method sendIntent, and all methods that receive an intent as the method onReceive. For example, in Figure 2, startActivity(), called on line 7, is an example of a sendIntent method, and the method getIntent(), declared on line 20, is an example of an onReceive method.

The type system verifies that for any sendIntent method call and any onReceive method declaration that can be invoked by the call site, the intent type of the argument in the sendIntent call is compatible with the intent type of the parameter declared in the onReceive method signature.

1) Intent types: We introduce intent types, which hold key– type pairs that limit the values that can be mapped by a key.

Syntax of intent types. This paper uses the following syntax for an intent map type:

@Intent("K1" \rightarrow t1, ..., "Kn" \rightarrow tn) Intent i = ...;

where { "K1",..., "Kn"} is a set of literal strings and { t1,...,tn } is a set of types. The type of variable i above consists of a type qualifier @Intent(...) and a Java type Intent. The regular

²Activity, Service, BroadcastReceiver, and ContentProvider are the four kinds of Android components. See http://developer.android.com/guide/components/ fundamentals.html#Components.

$$\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline Subtyping \\ \hline Subtyping \\ \hline Subtyping \\ \hline \\ (ST) & \dfrac{\forall \ k \in keys(\tau_2). \ \ k \in keys(\tau_1) \ \ \ \tau_1[k] = \tau_2[k]}{\tau_1 < \tau_2} \\ \hline \\ (CP) & \dfrac{\forall \ k \in keys(\tau_2). \ \ k \in keys(\tau_1) \ \ \ \tau_1[k] <: \tau_2[k]}{\tau_1 <_{copyable} \ \tau_2} \\ \hline \\ (OR) & \dfrac{Well-formedness}{\hline void \ onReceive(\tau \ i)} \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ \hline \\ Typing \ judgments \\ \hline \end{tabular}$$

 $(\text{SI}) \begin{array}{c} \forall \text{ onReceive}(b,j). \quad \langle \text{sendIntent}(a,i), \text{onReceive}(b,j) \rangle \in \textit{CCP} \\ i:\tau_i \quad j:\tau_j \quad \tau_i <_{\text{copyable}} \tau_j \\ \text{sendIntent}(a,i):int \end{array}$

$$(\text{PE1}) \quad \frac{e:\tau \quad v:\tau[k] \quad k \in \text{keys}(\tau) \quad s: \texttt{@StringVal}(k)}{e.\text{putExtra}(s,v):\tau}$$

(PE2)
$$\frac{e:\tau \quad k \notin \text{keys}(\tau) \quad e \text{ is unaliased } s: \texttt{@StringVal}(k)}{e.\text{putExtra}(s,v):\tau}$$
(GE)
$$\frac{e:\tau \quad k \in \text{keys}(\tau) \quad s: \texttt{@StringVal}(k)}{e.\text{getExtra}(s):\tau[k]}$$

Fig. 5. Type system for Android intents. Standard rules are omitted.

Java type system verifies the Java type, and our intent type system verifies the type qualifier.

The actual Java syntax used by our implementation is slightly more verbose than that in this paper:

```
@Intent(@Entry(key="K1", type="t1"), ...,
    @Entry(key="Kn", type="tn")) Intent i = ...;
```

Semantics of intent types. If variable i is declared to have an intent type T, then two constraints hold. (1) The keys of i that are accessed must be a subset of T's keys. It is permitted for the run-time value of variable i to have more keys than those listed in T, but they may not be accessed. It is also permitted for the run-time value of variable i to have fewer keys than those listed in T; any access to a missing key will return null. (2) For every key k in T, k is missing from the run-time key set of i, or the value mapped by k in the run-time value of i has the type mapped by k in T. This can be more concisely expressed as $\forall k \in domain(T)$. i[k] : T[k], where ":" indicates typing and null is a value of every non-primitive type.

Example. The example below illustrates the declaration and use of intent types. The symbols @A, @B, and @c denote type qualifiers, such as <code>@High</code> and <code>@Low</code> of the noninterference type system. On the left is the type hierarchy of these type qualifiers.

	@Intent("akey" \rightarrow @C) Intent i =	
0A	<pre>@A int s1 = i.getIntExtra("akey");</pre>	// legal
/ \	<pre>@C int s1 = i.getIntExtra("akey");</pre>	// legal
@B @C	<pre>@B int s3 = i.getIntExtra("akey");</pre>	// violates (2)
	i.getIntExtra("otherKey");	// violates (1)

2) Type system rules: Figure 5 shows the typing rules for the intent type system. These rules are organized into three

categories, according to their purpose. Subtyping rules define a subtyping relation for intent types, well-formedness rules define which constructions are acceptable, and typing judgment rules define the types associated to different language expressions.

a) Subtyping (ST): Intent type τ_1 is a subtype of intent type τ_2 if the key set of τ_2 is a subset of the key set of τ_1 and, for each key k in both τ_1 and τ_2 , k is mapped to the same type.

```
\begin{array}{l} \texttt{@Intent("akey" \rightarrow t, "anotherkey" \rightarrow t) Intent i1 = \ldots;} \\ \texttt{@Intent("akey" \rightarrow t) Intent i2 = \ldots;} \\ \texttt{@Intent("anotherkey" \rightarrow t)) Intent i3 = \ldots;} \\ \texttt{i2 = i1; // legal} \\ \texttt{i1 = i3; // illegal} \end{array}
```

The mapped types must be exactly the same; use of a subtyping requirement $\tau_1[k] <: \tau_2[k]$ instead of equality $\tau_1[k] = \tau_2[k]$ would lead to unsoundness in the presence of aliasing. The example below illustrates this problem. (On the left is the type qualifier hierarchy.)

```
\begin{array}{ccc} & \mbox{@C String c;} & \\ & \mbox{@Intent("akey" \rightarrow @B) Intent i1;} \\ / & \mbox{@Intent("akey" \rightarrow @A) Intent i2;} \\ & \mbox{@B @C } & \mbox{i2 = i1;} & // \mbox{illegal} \\ & \mbox{i2 = putExtra("akey", c);} \end{array}
```

It would be incorrect to allow the assignment i2 = i1 in the previous example, which is valid according to standard objectoriented typing. In this case, the call to putExtra would store, in the object pointed by i1, a value of incorrect type at key akey. This happens because the references i1 and i2 are aliased to the same intent object.

b) Copyable (CP): Copyable is a subtyping-like relationship with the weaker requirement $\tau_1[k] <: \tau_2[k]$. It may be used only when aliasing is not possible, which occurs when onReceive is invoked by the Android system, as explained in the (SI) rule below.

c) Calls to sendIntent (SI): A sendIntent call can be viewed as an invocation of one or more onReceive methods. A sendIntent call type-checks if its intent argument is copyable to the formal parameter of each corresponding onReceive method. CCP (see Section IV-A) is used to determine each onReceive method of a sendIntent call. The type comparison uses the copyable relation, not subtyping. This is sound because the Android system passes a copy of the intent argument to onReceive, so aliasing is not a concern.

d) Declarations of onReceive (OR): A declaration of onReceive always type-checks. The standard Java overriding rules do not apply to declarations of onReceive: the intent type of the formal parameter of onReceive is not restricted by the type of the parameter in the overridden declaration. This is allowable because by convention onReceive is never called directly but rather is only called by the Android system. The type-checker prohibits direct calls to onReceive methods; this constraint is omitted from Figure 5 for brevity.

e) Calls to putExtra (PE): If the receiver of a putExtra call might have aliases, then the argument's type must be a subtype of the type with the specified key in the map. This prevents an alias from modifying an intent in such a way that it violates the type of another alias. For example:

```
@IntentMap("k" → @Low) Intent a = new Intent();
@IntentMap() Intent b = a;
@High String hs = ...;
b.putExtra(k, hs); // does not type-check
a.getExtra(k);
```

If the receiver has no aliases, then the key is permitted to be missing from the map type.

$$\frac{e.\mathsf{putExtra}(s,v) \quad e:\tau \quad v:\sigma \quad k \notin \mathsf{keys}(\tau)}{e \text{ is unaliased}} \\ \frac{e:\tau \cup \{k \to \sigma\}}{e:\tau \cup \{k \to \sigma\}} \\ \frac{e.\mathsf{putExtra}(s,v) \quad e:\tau \cup \{k \to _\} \quad v:\sigma}{e \text{ is unaliased}} \\ \frac{e:\tau \cup \{k \to \sigma\}}{e:\tau \cup \{k \to \sigma\}}$$

Fig. 6. Type inference rules for intent types. Standard rules are omitted.

f) Calls to getExtra (GE): The rule for getExtra is straightforward.

For both the PE and GE rules, the call (putExtra or getExtra) type-checks only if the key is a statically computable expression, according to the dataflow analysis of Section III-A2. For all 1,052 apps in the F-Droid repository, 93% of all keys could be statically computed.

3) Type inference: Annotations are rarely required within method bodies, because the intent type system performs flow-sensitive local type inference. Consider the following example:

```
@Intent Intent i = new Intent(); // i has type @Intent()
i.putExtra("k", h); // i now has type @Intent("k"→0High)
i.putExtra("k", l); // i now has type @Intent("k"→0Low)
```

In this case, the receiver expression of a putExtra call is an unaliased local variable, so its type can be refined by adding the key-type pair from the putExtra call. We implemented a modular aliasing analysis that determines whether an expression is unaliased.

Figure 6 shows two cases for the putExtra type inference rules for intent types. For both cases, the key argument of the putExtra call must be a statically computable expression (Section III-A2) and the receiver expression must be unaliased. For the first case, if the intent type of the receiver expression does not have a key-type pair with the same key passed as an argument, then the intent type is refined with the new key mapping to the type of the value passed as argument. For the second case, if the intent type already has a key-type pair with the same key, then the type in this key-type pair is replaced by the type of the value passed as an argument. A further standard condition (omitted from Figure 6 for brevity) is that the new intent type must be a subtype of the declared type.

C. Example

Recall the example of Figure 2. A noninterference typechecker would report a false-positive warning when run on Aard Dictionary, because the type system is unable to deduce that all extra data from the corresponding intent is of type Low. Using our implementation, a developer can express this property by overriding the method getIntent (inherited from class Activity) in class WordTranslator, qualifying its return type with an @Intent type. The code snippet below shows this addition to WordTranslator.

00verride

The intent variable i in DictionaryMain.translateWord(), before being sent, will have its intent type refined to:

<code>@Intent("source" \rightarrow @Low, "target" \rightarrow @Low, "word" \rightarrow @Low)</code>

The copyable typing rule enforces that the intent variable i in method DictionaryMain.translateWord() has a compatible type with the return type of WordTranslator.getIntent(). By extending the noninterference type system with our intent type system and adding the correct annotations to the return type of WordTranslator.getIntent(), the Aard Dictionary example type-checks and the developer is assured that the program does not contain security vulnerabilities that could leak private data. Note that any developer-written annotations in the program are checked, not trusted.

V. FORMAL ANALYSIS

Our implementation works on Java code: it does not analyze native calls. For efficiency, it relies on trusted annotations for system libraries. These are standard limitations of a static analysis. Section IV-A notes other limitations regarding the estimation of component communication patterns.

Modulo these limitations, our analysis is sound. That is, if a program type-checks, then the type of any expression is a sound estimate of its possible run-time values.

For reflection, this means that the value for a Class or Method expression is contained within the set of possible values in its type, and likewise for array lengths.

For intents, this means that if an expression has a type with an intent key–type pair, then at run time the expression's value is an intent whose extra data maps the key to a value of that type, or the key does not appear in the map.

Equally importantly, the resolution preserves any soundness property for a downstream analysis. If the downstream analysis is sound when using the conservative library annotations, then it remains sound when using more precise summaries supplied by the reflection and intent resolvers.

It is possible to state formal type-correctness, progress, and preservation theorems for our type systems. The theorems are standard and their proofs are straightforward.

VI. EVALUATION OF TYPE INFERENCE

We evaluated our work in two ways. First, this section measures the effectiveness of our type inference rules. Second, Section VII reports how much our reflection and intent analyses improve the precision of a downstream analysis, which is their entire purpose.

A. Subject programs

We used open-source apps from the F-Droid repository [8] to evaluate our approach. F-Droid contains 1,052 apps that have an average size of 9,237 LOC^3 and do not use third-party libraries.

39% of F-Droid apps use reflection, with on average 11 reflective method or constructor invocations. 69% of F-Droid apps use intents with extra data, with on average 24 calls to putExtra or getExtra. 24% of F-Droid apps use both reflective calls *and* intents with extra data. These numbers support our motivation to pursue static analysis of reflection and intents.

We randomly sampled 10 apps (Figure 7), excluding unusually simple apps (<2 kLOC, or no use of reflection or intents) and unusually complex apps (>15 kLOC). and 37 calls to putExtra or getExtra. We used these 10 apps to evaluate our approaches in Sections VI and VII.

³Non-comment, non-blank lines of code, as reported by David A. Wheeler's SLOCCount. See http://www.dwheeler.com/sloccount/.

Арр	LOC	Reflecti	ve invocations	Intent uses	
		Method	Constructor	putExtra	getExtra
AbstractArt	4,488	1	0	1	1
arXiv	3,643	14	0	70	17
BluezIME	4,523	4	2	124	42
ComicsReader	6.612	6	0	1	2
MultiPicture	7,496	1	0	17	12
PrimitiveFTP	4,026	2	0	1	1
RemoteKeyboard	5,723	1	0	3	4
SuperGenPass	2,125	1	0	15	14
VimTouch	8,881	1	0	7	6
VLCRemote	5,097	1	0	12	21
Total	52,614	32	2	251	120

Fig. 7. Selected subject apps from the F-Droid repository.

B. Reflection resolution

In addition to our 10 subject apps, we arbitrarily selected 25 apps from F-Droid that use reflection. Using the entire set of 35 apps, we investigated how reflection is used in the wild and how effective our reflection resolution is in practice. More concretely, we evaluated the effectiveness of the reflection resolution by studying the subsequent three research questions.

1) How is reflection used?: The 35 apps contain 142 invocations of reflective methods or constructors. 81% are used to provide backward compatibility, 6% access a non-public API, and 13% are for other use cases.

2) How often can reflection be resolved at compile time?: Our reflection resolution resolved 93% of instances of reflective method or constructor invocations. It failed on the other 7% because the reflectively invoked method or constructor cannot be determined statically. As an example, the RemoteKeyboard app uses reflection for extensibility and duck typing: the user can configure the class name for a shell implementation, and the app reflectively invokes a factory method on this class. Moreover, these shell implementations do not have a common interface that defines the factory method, rendering static reflection resolution impossible.

3) How effective is type inference for reflection resolution?: To enable reflection resolution, a developer may have to write type annotations in a program.

For 52% of reflective invocations, our intra-procedural type inference (Section III-A2) determined the exact method that is reflectively invoked without requiring a single annotation.

For 32% of reflective invocations, the annotations could be inferred with an intra-class inference, which we have not yet implemented. A common example is the initialization of a private field of type Class or Method. These fields are only assigned once but are initialized within a method that provides exception handling.

In 9% of reflective invocations, the annotations could be inferred by inter-procedural, whole-program analysis. An example is the use of a helper method that manipulates Strings and returns an object of type Method.

The other 7% of reflection invocations cannot be statically resolved (see Section VI-B2).

Figure 9 gives the number of programmer-written annotations that were required. Recall that all annotations in an app are checked, not trusted. Thus, use of developer-supplied annotations does not compromise the soundness of our approach.

4) Bug detection: Our reflection resolver revealed a bug in the arXiv app. The reflection resolver reported an unresolvable method even though the class name, method name, and the number of parameters were precisely inferred. The bug was a misspelled method name, and it prevented a menu from being updated. The developer confirmed the bug.

C. Intent type inference

The 10 apps require a total of 24 developer-written annotations for sent intents with extras. Without intent type inference (Section IV-B3), the apps would have needed an additional 35 developer-written annotations in order to type-check.

For 67% of the cases, our intra-procedural inference determined that the sent intent had no aliases and precisely inferred the type of the sent intent. For those cases, developer-written annotations are not necessary.

For 21% of the cases, the intent is returned by a method in the app, and the inference correctly infers the return type. For compatibility with other Java compilers, our implementation does not change annotations in method signatures. Therefore, an annotation is needed in order to support separate compilation of different parts of the app.

For 12% of the cases, the sent intent was stored in a field. Our alias analysis (Section IV-B3) treated such intents as possibly-aliased, so the intent type cannot be refined using the putExtra rule.

VII. IMPROVING A DOWNSTREAM ANALYSIS

The purpose of resolving reflection and intents is to improve the precision of a downstream analysis. Section VII-A measures the improvement in precision, and Section VII-B shows the programmer effort required to achieve the improved precision.

For our evaluation, the downstream analysis is the Information Flow Checker (IFC), a type system and corresponding typechecker that prevents unintended leakage of sensitive data from an application [1]. Given a program and an information-flow policy (a high-level specification of information flow, expressed as source–sink pairs), IFC guarantees that no other information flows occur in the program. IFC is sound: it issues a warning if the information flow type of any variable or expression does not appear in the information-flow policy. IFC is also conservative: if it issues a warning, then the program might or might not misbehave at run time.

A. RQ1: How much do our reflection and intent analyses improve precision of IFC?

We measured the precision and recall of IFC's static estimate of possible information flows. To compute precision and recall, we manually determined the ground truth: the actual number of flows that could occur at run time in an app.⁴ Precision is the number of ground-truth flows, divided by the total number of flows reported by the analysis. Recall is the number of real flows reported by the analysis, divided by the total number of ground-truth flows.⁵ We confirmed that IFC has 100% recall both with and without the reflection and intent analyses, i.e., IFC is sound and misses no real flows.

⁴This enormous manual effort is the reason we did not run the experiments on all 1,052 F-Droid apps. It would be easy to run our analyses on all the apps, but doing so would not indicate whether our analyses were useful.

⁵Since IFC is sound, it reports every ground-truth flow.




Fig. 8. Comparison of precision among techniques.

To evaluate RQ1, we compared the precision of the following techniques.

IFC-unsound makes optimistic assumptions about every reflective and intent-related call. This approach is unsound, which is unacceptable in the security domain. Its recall is 95% and its precision is 100%.

IFC treats reflection and intents conservatively. Data in an intent may be from any source and may flow to any sink. Data used as an argument to a reflective invocation may flow to any sink, and data returned from a reflective invocation may be from any source. In the absence of reflection and intents, IFC is an effective analysis with high precision, as shown by IFC-unsound. However, for our subject programs, which use reflection and intents, IFC's precision is just 0.24%.

IFC+RR augments IFC with reflection resolution and can therefore treat data that is used in reflection precisely when the reflection can be resolved. Data in intents, however, is treated conservatively. Reflection resolution alone does not help; the average precision remains 0.24%.

IFC+INT augments IFC with intent analysis. It reports precise information flows for method calls involving intents. Data passed to a reflective invocation is treated as flowing to any sink the app may access. Similarly, data returned from a reflective invocation is treated as if it could have come from all sources listed in the manifest. However, since Epicc generates CCP and unsoundly assumes that reflective calls do not invoke sendIntent methods, IFC+INT must issue a warning any time a method is reflectively invoked. A developer can manually verify that the reflective method does not invoke sendIntent and suppress this warning. The average precision is 53%.

IFC+INT+RR augments IFC with both reflection resolution and intent analysis. When reflection resolution cannot resolve a method or when it resolves a method to sendIntent, it still issues a warning. The average precision is 100%

Figure 8 plots the precision for the sound techniques. IFC+INT and IFC+INT+RR. We manually verified that sendIntent is never invoked reflectively in any app. IFC+INT reports perfect precision for AbstractArt, MultiPicture, PrimitiveFTP, and RemoteKeyboard, because these apps use reflection for control flow, not data flow — data returned from reflective calls is not sent to a sensitive sink and no sensitive information is passed as an argument to a reflective method call. For the other 6 apps, IFC+INT is more precise than IFC,

Арр	LOC	# of Annotations			
		IFC	Reflection	Intents	
AbstractArt	4,488	317	0	3	
arXiv	3,643	130	0	19	
BluezIME	4,523	285	2	22	
ComicsReader	6.612	381	5	15	
MultiPicture	7,496	511	0	26	
PrimitiveFTP	4,026	321	2	3	
RemoteKeyboard	5,723	580	0	4	
SuperGenPass	2,125	181	0	10	
VimTouch	8,881	2,424	4	7	
VLCRemote	5,097	453	0	32	
Total	52,614	5,583	13	141	

Fig. 9. Annotation overhead for the technique IFC+INT+RR. The column IFC shows the number of @Source and @Sink information flow annotations. The column Reflection shows the number of @MethodVal and @ClassBound annotations (no @ClassVal annotations were required). The column Intents shows the number of @Intent annotations.

but still reports flows that cannot happen at run time. For these apps, the reflection resolver is needed to reach 100% precision as reported by IFC+INT+RR.

All uses of reflection could be resolved except for one in the RemoteKeyboard app. For that case, the reflection resolver could determine the name of the invoked method (createShell) and the number of parameters (0), but the class name is obtained from preferences that the user can edit at run time. However, since this method is not sendIntent, its returned object is not sent to any sink, and it takes no parameters, treating that call conservatively did not decrease the precision of IFC+INT+RR.

B. RQ2: What is the annotation overhead for programmers?

Figure 9 shows the annotations required to type-check each app. Less than 3% as many annotations are required due to reflection and intents, compared to annotations related to information flow (the downstream analysis). The average time to add each annotation was roughly one minute. Thus, the annotation overhead is small in absolute and relative terms, especially considering the significant improvements in precision shown above.

VIII. RELATED WORK

A. Reflection

The most common approach for improving precision of a static analysis in the presence of reflection is profiling from an observed set of executions. Livshits [12] requires user annotations or dynamic information from casts to estimate reflection targets as part of static call graph construction. Tatsubori [13] earlier built a system with similar qualities. TamiFlex [14] performs unsound dynamic analysis of reflection and dynamic class loading. It assumes that the observed program exercises all possible behaviors, replaces uses of reflection by standard method calls, and supplies the modified call graphs to existing static-analysis tools. In other words, an unsound analysis can be built on top of TamiFlex, just as a sound analysis can be built on top our our work. An example is that Averroes [15] can use TamiFlex when building call graphs, to unsoundly improve precision over its conservative defaults. All of these approaches that use dynamic information are unsound. By contrast, our approach is sound: it makes conservative assumptions about any occurrence of reflection that it cannot handle.

In some special cases, reflection can be resolved based on assumptions about the run-time execution context. For example, GUI error detector [16] builds reflection-aware call graphs for Android applications, enabling it to find more GUI errors than without. However, it only handles a particular scenario — it converts reflective calls into explicit constructor invocations based on the contents of configuration files at compile time. This approach is if the same configuration files will be installed at run time as at analysis time. This is the same assumption made by Epicc [3] to handle inter-component communication, which our system uses.

A few static analyses partially handle reflection. Javari [17] introduces a new API to invoke reflection that does a single dynamic check of the method signature rather than of the object. Programs using that API can be soundly type-checked. Our approach could eliminate that special API and the runtime check. Li et al. [18] developed and evaluated an effective but unsound self-inferencing reflection resolution to improve the precision of a pointer analysis for Java programs. They additionally provided insights into how reflection is used in large, open-source Java applications. In contrast, our approach is sound and our evaluation focuses on the use of reflection in Android apps.

B. Android

We evaluated our reflection and intent analyses in the context of detecting and preventing malicious behavior in mobile apps [7], [19]–[29]. We discuss some closely related work.

SCanDroid [19] applies data flow analysis to check security properties in Android apps. It analyzes intra-component and inter-component information flows for vulnerabilities. The analysis cannot handle interactions between apps and provides limited support to handle intent extras, making no distinction between the flows of permissions that result from the entries of an intent. Several other techniques came after it [7], [22]-[27], [30], improving precision and recall of reported warnings. However, to the best of our knowledge, no later technique has focused on handling the important aspect of data encapsulation in intents. Our technique is complementary to existing fullyautomatic static analysis techniques such as SCanDroid: the analysis we present requires a small number of annotations from the developer and provides stronger guarantees. It preserves soundness and achieves good precision at the expense of automation.

FlowDroid [30] is a technique that performs taint analysis on Android apps with the goal of finding security vulnerabilities. FlowDroid does not support implicit intents and reflection, but experimental results indicate that the tool achieves high precision (83%) and recall (93%) for apps containing different types of vulnerabilities.

Our implementation currently relies on Epicc [3] to approximate the set of component pairs that actually communicate. See Section IV-A for a discussion.

Our implementation has been publicly available since December 12, 2013. In forthcoming work, IccTA [31] adopts a similar approach that performs taint analysis in the presence of inter-component communication. IccTA's reflection resolution is much more limited than ours: it only processes string constants. Although IccTA is applied to taint analysis, IccTA is neither sound nor complete; by contrast to our work, it provides no security guarantees to its user and is not applicable in the context of high-assurance app stores [1]. Even if the analysis flaws were addressed, IccTA would remain vulnerable because its taint model uses an insufficient set of sensitive sources and sinks. Another difference is the evaluation: we measured the precision and recall of our information-flow analysis on real Android apps and achieved 100% precision and recall, but IccTA was evaluated on 22 examples hand-crafted by the authors, where it achieved 96% precision and recall. We believe the IccTA approach is promising and look forward to further improvements.

C. Other

Xiao et al. [32] proposed a semi-automatic approach to analyze TouchDevelop mobile app scripts for privacy. Their workflow is similar to ours: users annotate APIs and code, and the analyzer uses a dataflow analysis to check conformance of inferred flows against a specification of the app. However, their static analysis does not handle implicit control flows.

Google's Android NDK [33] allows parts of an app to be implemented using native-code languages such as C and C++. Our toolset does no analysis of native code: it is sound under the assumption that any native methods have a conservative summary. The Checker Framework, on which our implementation is built, treats unannotated methods conservatively.

Our work has some similarities to call graph construction in object-oriented programs [34], [35]. Dynamic dispatching can be viewed as an implicit control flow mechanism, much as Java reflection and Android intents can. Most call graph construction algorithms do whole-program pointer analysis. Our approach is modular but relies on user annotations. A whole-program type inference or pointer analysis could infer the annotations.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

We have presented novel analyses for two programming paradigms — Java reflection and Android intents — that are useful to programmers but challenging for static analysis. Our analyses statically resolve reflection targets and intent payloads. Though sound and conservative, they achieve high precision in practice, as confirmed by experiments on real-world Android apps. Our implementations are publicly available as open source, and they can be integrated with an arbitrary downstream analysis to improve its precision.

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